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THE INVESTMENT BANKERS CASE: THE USE OF
SEMANTICS TO AVOID THE PER SE ILLEGALITY
OF PRICE FIXING*
SECrION 1 of the Sherman Act condemns all contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade.1 The Supreme Court interpreted this lan-
guage as prohibiting only unreasonable restrictions of competition without
clearly explaining the method of determining whether a particular restriction
is or is not unreasonable.2 But even as the Court reformulated the lay, in the
Standard Oil case, it pointed out that certain contracts or other arrangements
were inherently unreasonable, giving rise to an irrebuttable presumption
of illegality.3 And a long line of decisions conclusively establishes that all price
fixing agreements are illegal per se.4
*United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953. This Note
treats only one facet of the case. See note 10 infra.
1. The section reads in part, as follows: "Every contract, combination in the form
of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the feveral
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 26 ST,%T. 269 (1S l0),
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
2. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-64 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 178-0 (1911). The most cogent statement of the
rule of reason is that of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Unitcd
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) : "But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot
be determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agree-
ment concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of
their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordi-
narily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and
its effect, actual or probable."
3. In distinguishing United States v. Trans-Mfissouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897), and United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 05 (1S93), the Court de-
clared that those "cases but decided that the nature and character of the contracts,
creating as they did a conclushe presmnptionz which brought them within the statute, such
result vvas not to be disregarded by the substitution of a judicial appreciation of what
the law ought to be for the plain judicial duty of enforcing the law as it was made."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (emphasis supplied).
4. "Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation ad-
hered to the principle that price fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sher-
man Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils xwhich thoze
agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense."
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). .4ccord, United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 3S5 (1951) ; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, InQ, 340
U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Eds., 339 U.S. 4 5
(1950); Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948s;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. U.S.
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In the recent case of United States v. Morgan,5 the Government charged
that three types of contracts commonly used by underwriting syndicates in
distributing new issues of securities are illegal per se.0 Agreements among
members of an underwriting syndicate to maintain the public offering price
during the period of distribution were attacked as horizontal price fixing.7
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287
(1948) ; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 323 U.S. 293 (1945) ; United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. Masonite Corp.,
316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). See Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing-Sans
Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 837 (1952).
Neither Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), nor Board of
Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), involves deviations from the
rule that all price fixing agreements are illegal per se. Board of Trade of Chicago in-
volved the legality of a Board rule which prohibited its members from "offering to pur-
chase, during the period between the close of the call and the opening of the session on
the next business day, any wheat, corn, or rye 'to arrive' at a price other than the closing
bid at the call." Id. at 237. The closing bid was set by competitive forces in the market.
Id. at 239-40. The Court emphasized that "the government . . . made no attempt to
show the rule was designed to or that it had the effect . . . of raising or depressing
prices," id. at 238, and stated that it viewed the rule as a restriction on the period of
competitive price fixing rather than as a price fixing agreement. "Every Board of Trade
... imposes some restraint on the conduct of business by its members. Those relating
to the hours in which business may be done are common; and they make a special appeal
where, as here, they tend to shorten the working day or, at least, limit the period of most
exacting activity." Id. at 241 (emphasis supplied). See also id. at 239. Thus, since neither
the purpose nor the effect of the rule was to set prices, the rule was not a per se
violation of § 1. Appalachian Coals is distinguishable on similar grounds. See note 34
infra.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly defined price fixing in very broad
terms. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222-3 (1940):
"Hence prices are fixed within, the meaning of the . . . [Sherman Act] if the range
within which purchases or sales will be made is agreed upon, if the prices paid or charged
are to be at a certain level or on ascending or descending scales, if they are to be uniform,
or if by various formulae they are related to the market prices. They are fixed because
they are agreed upon. And the fact that, as here, they are fixed at the fair going
market price is immaterial." However one circuit court has found this definition too
vague to be helpful. See Cargill, Inc. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 164 F.2d 820, 823
(7th Cir. 1947).
5. Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953.
6. The Government did not attack the legality of the syndicate system; it merely
attacked the resale price agreements usually employed by such syndicates. Brief for
United States, pp. 11, 37-40, 76-80, United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y.,
October 14, 1953.
The syndicate method of security distribution is explained and evaluated in Comment,
Price Mraintenance in the Distribution of New Securities, 56 YALe L.J. 333 (1947). See
National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 451-9 (1945). See also Parlin
& Everett, The Stabilization of Security Prices, 49 COL L. REv. 607 (1949).
7. Brief for United States, pp. 6-8, 16-22, United States v. Morgan, supra note 6.
Horizontal price fixing has been consistently condemned by the Supreme Court since the
early railroad rate bureau cases, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
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Agreements between underwriters and dealers in the selling group fixing the
price at which dealers may resell the securities were attacked as resale price
maintenance agreements.8 And agreements authorizing the syndicate manager
to repurchase securities which appear during the period of distributiun at or
below the agreed public offering price were attacked as agreements authoriz-
ing a means of stabilizing prices.9
(1893) ; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1397). See, C.q.,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (agreement
among producers to maintain maximum resale prices on their preducts); United
States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950) (agrec-
ment among real estate brokers fixing minimum brokerage fees); United Statei
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (agreement among major refiners to
"stabilize" the price of gasoline in spot markets by purchasing the "distress" gasoline of
independent refiners); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)
(agreement among manufacturers and distributors of vitreous pAtery bathr.om fixtures
to fix prices and limit outlets).
S. Brief for United States, pp. 6-8, 16, 22-30, United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-
757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953. The leading case condemning resale price maintenance
agreements is Dr. MAliles Medical Co. -. Park & Sons Co., =Z0 U.S. 373 (1911) (agree-
ments between manufacturer and dealers setting the wholesale and retail price ,f
proprietary medicines). See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948) (agreements between producers, distributors, and exhibitors setting minimum
admission prices); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944$
(agreements between distributor and its wholesalers and retailers setting re~ale price o~f
unpatented lenses); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (agreement
between owner of patents and distributor-finishers setting the resale price of finished
lenses) ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) (agreement between
patentee, licensee-refiners, and jobbers controlling the price pulicies of jobbers). BRut
cf. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (patentee allowed to set
resale prices of its licensee and bona fide agents).
Resale price maintenance contracts will escape judicial condemnation if they can b2
brought within the provisions of the Miller-Tydings Amendment to § 1 of the Sherman
Act. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). However this amendment is construed
strictly against those seeking its protection. See, c.g., Schwegrnann lros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); United States Y. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241
(1942). And agreements among competitors, such as are involved in the instant case,
are specifically exempt from the amendment. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,
Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296-7 (1945). Furthermore, the SEC has already stated that it
believes the amendment does not apply to securities. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers,
Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 446 n.35 (1945).
9. Brief for United States, pp. 6-8, 16, 30-2, United States v.. Morgan, Civil No. 43-
757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 223 (1940): "[P]urchases at or under the market are one species of price-fixing.
In this case the result was to place a floor under the market-a floor which served the
function of increasing the stability and firmness of market prices. That was repeatedly
characterized in this case as stabilization. But in terms of market operations stabilization
is but one form of manipulation. . . . Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for
the purpose and with the effect of ... stabilizing the price of a commedity in intersttate
or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Int,,
340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (reaffirming Soconzy on stabilization) ; Swift & Cu. v. United
States, 196 US. 375 (1905) (restraining a combination from raising, lowering, Ur fi.ing
prices).
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Judge Medina held that the legality of such contracts in general
was not properly in issue, 10 but felt compelled to state his views in dictum."
The court viewed participants in syndicate agreements as engaged in an ad hoc
common enterprise formed for the purpose of performing a service for the
issuer.' 2 Thus they are to be regarded as joint venturers rather than as
competitors in handling issues subject to syndicate agreements.'8 Judge Me-
dina declared that direct limitations on price competition among such joint
venturers is not price fixing within the meaning of the Sherman Act.14 Rather,
they should be regarded as ancillary to the main purpose of the joint venture:
the orderly distribution of a new issue of securities in behalf of the issuer.15
And its legality must be judicially determined by the measure of protection
needed to fulfill that purpose.' 6 Judge Medina concluded that agreements
containing provisions for a fixed offering price, price maintenance, and stabili-
zation might be entered into and performed under such circumstances that
they would amount to an unlawful suppression of competition but that the mere
making of such agreements is not unlawful per se.1
7
It is difficult to accept the court's "joint venture" theory.' 8 The members
10. United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953 [pp. 120-
23 Record Press].
The complaint charged an integrated, overall conspiracy on the part of 17 firms to
eliminate competition and monopolize the cream of the investment banking business. The
pre-trial and trial proceedings took approximately 6 years. In a 417 page opinion
Judge Medina dismissed the complaint after the Government had presented its case, on
the ground that a prima facie case of conspiracy had not been made out. Id. at 414-17.
This Note is concerned only with that part of the opinion dealing with the syndicate
price fixing agreements.
11. "True it is that the questions involved are important to the investment banking
industry as a whole; ...these questions have never before been decided by any court;
and much time and effort have been expended during this long trial in extensive and
scholarly research, the submission of voluminous briefs and in prolonged and helpful
argument by counsel." Id. at 121. "The following discussion of the questions of law
affecting the syndicate system in general, is by way of dictum." Id. at 123.
12. Id. at 128, 129-30, 131.
13. Id. at 128-9.
14. Id. at 129, 138-40.
15. Id. at 140
16. Id. at 132-3, 149. Cf. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271,
282-3, 290-1 (6th Cir. 1898).
17. See United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953
[pp. 132-3, 149 Record Press].
18. The SEC adopted a similar theory in National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
19 S.E.C. 424, 446-59, 462-4, 486-9 (1945). However, in that case the SEC set aside disci-
plinary action by the NASD against members of the NASD who had sold bonds below
the price schedules contained in the syndicate agreements. The SEC held that the
disciplinary powers of the NASD were limited by the requirement of § 15A (b) (7) of
the Securities Exchange Act that the association rules be designed to remove impedi-
ments to the mechanism of a free and open market. Id. at 433-6. The Commission then
continued: "It is axiomatic that a market is not 'free and open' with respect to a
security whose price is fixed by unilateral action of the sellers. . . .We cannot doubt
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of the syndicate do not possess the normal attributes of joint venturers."0
Iost syndicate agreements specifically state that the underwriters are not to
be so regarded 0 And since title passes from the underwriters to the members
of the selling group, the dealers cannot be viewed as engaged in a joint venture
with the underwriters.2 1 Furthermore, even if the underwriters and dealers
were engaged in a joint venture, the fact would be immaterial. The Sherman
Act is concerned with the substance of an agreement, not its form.2 And no
amount of judicial semantics can change the fact that underwriters and dealers
that price-maintenance and fixed discount contracts are designed to restrict the fre
movement of price during distribution, and are per se 'impediments to . . . a free and
open market'. . . ." Id. at 440. The Commission then went on to point out that the
reasonableness and necessity of the restraints were irrelevant to the issue of the NASD's
rule-making and disciplinary powers because Congress had limited those powers by
statute. Id. at 442-5. Thus the SEC's rationale of its holding in the case contradicts its
dicta on the legality of syndicate price fixing agreements under the Sherman Act. See
also id. at 46S-9, 490.
19. The members of the syndicate do not share the profits or losses on the sale
of the securities. The individual members of the syndicate purchase a share of the securi-
ties. When they sell those securities they are selling their ovn property, and the profit
or loss of each sale is the profit or loss of the individual underwriter or dealer. Yet one
of the essential characteristics of a joint venture-which is essentially a partnership,
limited in scope and duration-is profit sharing. CnM,E, PARTzmnsuip §§ 35, 14 (1952).
20. The disclaimer is intended to render each underwriter immune from liability
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 4S STxr. 82 (1933), as amended, 43 Sr,.-,.
907-08 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77K (1946), for that part of the issue distributed by the
other members of the syndicate. United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y.,
October 14, 1953 [pp. 41-2 Record Press]. Section 206(d) of that Act imposes a civil
liability on each underwriter, for any omission or misstatement of a material fact in the
registration, equal to the total price at which the securities underwritten and distributed
by him were offered to the public. Ibid. The tax on transfers of securities is another
reason the underwriters purchase securities from the issuer in severalty rather than
jointly. Ibid.
21. The passage of title from the underwriters to the members of the selling group
cannot be regarded as "a purely fortuitous and incidental feature." Id. at 131. The Supreme
Court has stated that passage of title is a fundamental fact in antitrust litigation. See, e.g.,
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407, 409 (1911) : "The agreements
are designed to maintain prices, after the complainant has parted ,ith the title to the articles,
and to prevent competition among those who trade in them .... The complainant having
sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled to whatever advantage
may be derived from competition in the subsequent traffic." (emphasis supplied).
Judge Medina's view is similar to that which has been rejected by the Supreme Court
in developing the doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy. In those cases the Court repeatedly
refused to overlook the fact of separate corporate entity. See Comment, 63 YA UJ.
372 (1953).
22. "[A]I1 the difficulties suggested by the mere form in which the assailed transactions
are clothed become of no moment . . . [T]he generic designation of the first and second
sections of the law, when taken together, embraced every conceivable act which could
possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without regard
to the garb in which such acts were clothed." United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106, 180-1 (1911).
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have agreed to maintain a fixed price for the securities they severally own
during the period of distribution. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
set aside elaborate "licensing" 23 and "agency ' 24 contracts because they were
in reality mere price fixing agreements.2 5 And, in the Timken case, the Court
specifically rejected a contention that price fixing could be justified as ancillary
to a joint venture in which the defendants were engaged.
20
Judge Medina's view that members of the syndicate are merely perform-
ing a service for this issuer 27 is, at best, irrelevant. The issuer sells the se-
curities to the syndicate and receives payment at the time of the sale. 28 Thus,
when the underwriters and dealers sell the issue to the public, they are selling
their own merchandise. And in agreeing to maintain a fixed price for that
merchandise they are attempting to escape the risk of lower profits which
might result from allowing individual members of the syndicate to sell at
competitive prices. 29  Moreover, even if the defendants can be viewed as
merely performing a service for the issuer, that fact would be irrelevant to
the legality of the syndicate agreements. The syndicate's agreements fix
the price members are to receive for their "services" by fixing the spread be-
tween the price paid the issuer and the price maintained to the public. And
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that price fixing of services is just as
offensive to the Sherman Act as price fixing of goods.30
23. E.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
24. E.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
25. "So far as the Sherman Act is concerned, the result must turn not on the skill
with which counsel has manipulated the concepts of 'sale' and 'agency' but onl the significance
of the business practices in terms of restraint of trade." Id. at 280.
26. "Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the proposition that
agreements between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition
among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the project a 'joint venture.'
Perhaps every agreement and combination to restrain trade could be so labeled." Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951). See also id. at 597-8.
27. United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953 (pp.
128-31 Record Press].
28. See, e.g., the description of the Public Service Co. of Indiana underwriting in
National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 427, 456-7 (1945).
29. The members of the syndicate often attempt to sell their securities to the same
investor. Transcript of Record, pp. 16,402, 17,929, United States v. Morgan, Civil No.
43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953. Apparently Judge Medina regarded an agreement
between such competitive sellers to maintain a uniform price to all customers as an agree-
ment between quasi-partners not to cut each other's throat. United States v. Morgan,
supra [p. 129 Record Press]. Yet this is a perennial defense of price fixers, and it has
always been rejected by the Supreme Court. See notes 42-6 infra.
30. "The fixing of prices and other unreasonable restraints have been consistently
condemned in the case of services as well as goods. Transportation services . . . , cleaning,
dyeing, and renovating wearing apparel . . . , the procurement of medical and hospital
services ... , the furnishing of news or advertising services . . . -these indicate the range
of business activities that have been held to be covered by the Act." United States v.




As an alternative ground for deciding that the syndicate agreements were
not price fixing within the meaning of the Sherman Act, the court apparently
adopted the defendants' contention that price fixing is not illegal per se unless
done by persons controlling the general market.31 Securities, it reasoned, are
not bought and sold as unique 'commodities with special utilitarian functions;
they are purchased for investment on the basis of quality and yield. Thus the
new issue distributed by the syndicate is in competition with every seasoned
security of comparable quality, and members of the syndicate are in competi-
tion with every other dealer in such securities. Since any particular issue
is a tiny fraction of the general market in comparable securities, the syndicate
can have no effect whatsoever on general market prices.3 2 Therefore, price
fixing among the members of the syndicate in connection with one issue, and
for a limited period of time, is not illegal per se but subject to the rule of
reason.
33
While direct limitations on price competition among persons who as a
group are unable to affect market prices may be subject to the rule of reason, 3
the Supreme Court has specifically held that control of the general market is
unnecessary to render such agreements illegal per se.a5 All that is necessary
to violate Section 1 is the power to affect prices in an appreciable segment of
31. United States v. 'Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953 [pp. 129-
30 Record Press].
32. Ibid. See National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 451, 457-8
(1945).
33. United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953 [pp. 123,
132-3 Record Press].
34. In Appalachian Coals, Inc., v. United States, 28 U.S. 344 (1933), the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of an exclusive selling agency organized by a group of bitum inwus
coal producers. The case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In . ppa!adcfan
the Court held that the plan did not contemplate the fixing of market prices. Id. at 373.
In the instant case the agreements do contemplate the fixing of the market price of the
issue during the period of distribution. In Appalachian the Court held the selling agency
had no power to affect market prices directly. Id. at 373, 375. In the instant case the
syndicate has the power directly to affect the price of the issue during the periud of distri-
bution. In Appalachian the selling agency was not authorized to attempt to stabilize
market prices. Id. at 367. In the instant case the manager of the syndicate is specifically
authorized to attempt to stabilize the market price of the issue during the period of distri-
bution. And, finally, in Appalachian the Court directed the district court to retain jurisdic-
tion in order to take further action if the selling agency developed sufficient power to affect
prices directly. Id. at 377-8.
The Supreme Court distinguished Appalachia:n on these grounds in United States Y.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 214-17 (1940).
35. "[T]he thrust of the rule is deeper and reaches more than monopoly p wer. Any
combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Even
though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market,
to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfer-
ing with the free play of market forces. The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale.
... " Id. at 221. See id. at 224, 243-.
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the market.36 And there can be no doubt that the syndicate has sufficient
power to affect the price of a given issue during the period of distribution. In
fact defendants argued, and the court concluded, that it was necessary to allow
the syndicate to stabilize the price of new securities in order to insure their
orderly distribution. 37 The antitrust laws condemn all such schemes. 88
Whatever may be the peculiar problems and characteristics of investment
banking,30 the Sherman Act establishes a uniform rule applicable to all busi-
nesses.40 Any "combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se."'41 Such agreements cannot be
justified on the ground of business necessity, 42 suppression of competitive
36. "Proof that a combination was formed for the purpose of fixing prices and that it
caused them to be fixed or contributed to that result is proof of the completion of a price-
fixing conspiracy under § 1 of the Act." Ibid. (emphasis supplied). See also id. at 219-20,
244-7.
There is no need to prove that the members of the syndicate were able to affect the
general market price of all securities; it is sufficient that they were able to affect the
price of the securities subject to the syndicate agreements. "Section 1 of the Act out-
laws unreasonable restraints on interstate commerce, regardless of the amount of the
commerce affected. . . .Likewise irrelevant is the importance of the interstate commerce
affected in relation to the entire amount of that type of commerce in the United States....
[The defendant's] relative position in the field of cab production has no necessary relation
to [its] ability ... to conspire to monopolize or restrain, in violation of the Act, an
appreciable segment of interstate cab sales. An allegation that such a segment has been
or may be monopolized or restrained is sufficient." United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 302
U.S. 218, 225-6 (1947). See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 173
(1948) ; United States v. Soconoy-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940).
Moreover, price fixing agreements may well be illegal per se even though the con-
spirators have no power to affect prices. The Supreme Court has specifically said so
in dictum: "A conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 of the Act though no overt act is
shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available for
accomplishment of their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part of
the interstate or foreign commerce in the commodity." Id. at 224-5 n.59. See Comment,
The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing--Sans Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. oF
CGl. L. Rxv. 837 (1952). On the desirability of such a rule, compare this Comment,
with Jaffe & Tobriner, The Legality of Price Fixing Agreements, 45 HARv. L. R.Lv.
1164, 1181 (1932).
37. United States v. Morgan, Civil No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953 [pp. 129-
31 Record Press]. The same argument was accepted by the SEC in National Ass'n of
Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 442, 456-8, 492-3 (1945). "Orderly" distribution
means distribution at a non-competitive price. Id. at 468.
38. See note 35 supra.
39. See note 37 supra. It is diicult to understand why the fact that it may be
necessary for a reasonable number of underwriters to combine in order to raise sufficient
capital to purchase a new issue from the issuer also makes it necessary for the underwriters
to agree on the price at which they will sell the securities they individually own. See
notes 19-21, 28 supra.
40. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940).
41. Id. at 223.




abuses, 43 or other benefits to the public.44 And the reasonableness of the prices
set is irrelevant.4 5 Only specific legislative exemption can save such an agree-
ment from judicial condemnation ;46 Congress has twice refused to grant ex-
emption to these syndicate agreements.47 Lodged with the lower courts is a
duty to apply the law, even in dicta, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declared it rather than as they feel it ought to be.A8
43. E.g., United States v. Soconv-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-21 (1940).
44. "It is not for the courts to determine whether in particular settings, price-fixing
serves an honorable or worthy end. An agreement, shown either by adherence to a price
schedule or by proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is itself
illegal under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed to serve. That is the
teaching of an unbroken line of decisions." United States v. National Ass'n of Real
Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950).
45. "Beginning with United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asscriation . . . and
United States v. Joint Traffic Association ... it has since often been decided and always
assumed that uniform price fixing . . . is prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the
reasonableness of the particular prices agreed upon." United States v. Trenton Potteries
-Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927).
46. "Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular
price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted
the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-
fixing conspiracies.... If such a shift is to be made, it must be done by the Congress."
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-2 (1940).
The Court has repeatedly pointed out that the Sherman Act applies to every form of
interstate commerce. See Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 2Q6 U.S. 427,
434-5 (1932); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 293 (1945);
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553, 5t9-1 (1944).
Repeals by implication are not favored. United States v. Borden Co., 303 U.S. 19-1, 13-9
(1939). This is particularly true with regard to "implied" exemptions from the Sherman
Act. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-S (1940) ; Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951). Regulated industries
are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S.
439, 456 (1945). Wherever Congress wished to grant exemption from the Sherman Act
to particular businesses, groups, or practices it did so in clear, express, and definite
terms. E.g., § 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1946) (ex-
empting labor organizations) ; Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 ST.AT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. § 62
(1946) (exempting associations of producers engaged in export trade) ; Walter-McCarran
Act, 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1946) (limited exemption of insurance;
Reed-Buwinlde Act, 62 STAT. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (Supp. 1952) (exemptijn
of rate agreements among carriers). And when Congress wished to grant exnempticin
to certain activities in the field of securities, it did so in similarly precise terms. § 15A(mI
of the Maloney Act, 52 STAT. 1075 (193R), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1946) (limited excml,tion
for the rules of associations of securities dealers).
47. Shortly after the Antitrust Division filed its brief in the .\ational Ass'n of
Securities Dealers case, Congressman Reece introduced two bills to grant such e:Lmp-
tions. H.R. 5233, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) ; H.R. 1626, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
Both bills died in committee. The court in the instant case stated that this occurrcd
because the exemptions would have been too broad. United States v. Morgan, Ci- ii
No. 43-757, S.D.N.Y., October 14, 1953 [p. 146 Record Press]. Brit cf. Georgia
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 457 (1945).
48. See notes 44, 46 supra.
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